Gen. William E. DePuy's RELIEF Of Subordinates In Combat

William E. DePuy's major contribution to his country is the part he played in fixing the broken U.S. Army after the war in Vietnam. But his relief of subordinates while he commanded pi the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam quickly comes to mind at the mention of his name. The relief issue made DePuy a contentious figure. The answers to some pertinent questions will allow us to understand why he did what he did.

What was the climate in his division and in the echelons above the division as he assumed command and while he commanded?

Was his relief of subordinates unusual compared to other division commanders?

Why was he predisposed to swift relief?

Finally, were his actions reasonable? *

After working closely with Gen. William Westmoreland for almost two years, then-Maj. Gen. DePuy took command of the 1st Infantry Division, the Big Red One, knowing that Gen. Westmoreland wanted him "to get cracking." His division command post was located at Di An, between Saigon, the capital with its populous environs, and the Vietnam-Cambodia border.

Seen from the air, much of that border area was a trackless dense jungle, But for years it had been routinely trafficked by the enemy, who had developed a network of concealed base camps and lines of communication on both sides of the border and employed local irregulars to guide and support main-force combat elements. Gen. DePuy's understanding of Gen. Westmoreland's intent, the enemy threat to Saigon, and his personal style and preference impelled Gen. DePuy to action. In keeping with a theater strategy he had shaped as J-3 with Gen. Westmoreland's concurrence, Gen. DePuy would employ his division to destroy the enemy mainforce units.

DePuy believed that his predecessor as commander of the 1st Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman, had failed to exploit fully the division's striking power. In the Army's subculture it is not at all unusual for a new commander to come in bursting with ideas to improve the performance of the command, nor is some testiness between the outgoing and incoming commanders unusual. Men selected to command divisions are rarely blushing violets. Gen. DePuy had, at the behest of Gen. Westmoreland, assisted Gen. Seaman and other major tactical unit commanders in the initial settling-in during the flow of U.S. combat formations to Vietnam during the build-up in 1965 and early 1966. Gen. DePuy, the new division commander, was old in country; Gen. Seaman, the old division commander, was new in country.

It is important to note Gen. DePuy's close working relationship with Gen. Westmoreland in Vietnam from 1964 to 1967, a relationship evident again in 1969, when Gen. Westmoreland, as Army Chief of Staff, promoted DePuy to three-star rank and made him Assistant Vice Chief of Staff at a critical period in the history of the U.S. Army. Gen. Seaman had a correct formal relationship with Gen. Westmoreland, but he was aware of the Westmoreland-DePuy nexus.

Organizational changes were made to ensure effective command and control of all U.S. forces flowing into Vietnam just as DePuy took command of his division. Gen. Seaman was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed commander of the newly created II Field Force, a corps-level organization, the major subordinate commands of which included the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the latter commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick Weyand, later Army Chief of Staff when DePuy was Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander. The point is that instead of departing from Vietnam upon leaving division command, Gen. Seaman became Gen. DePuy's boss, thus placing Gen. Seaman between DePuy and Westmoreland in the chain of command. Due to command style, personalities, subordination and the Westmoreland relationships, DePuy and Seaman mixed like oil and water. Moreover, tall, gangly, old-shoe and nice-guy Gen. Weyand and small, intense, feisty and confrontational Gen. DePuy, two major generals commanding divisions side by side under Gen. Seaman, were inevitably compared. Gen. Seaman's staff, loyal to their boss, found much to criticize in Gen. DePuy's constant pressing for II Field Force assets, particularly helicopters. It was so much easier to deal with Gen. Weyand's staff.

Early in his command, DePuy moved his headquarters; he was concerned that the complacency he sensed in the comfortable and relatively safe rear area would infect his command. He observed that his division staff sections sent the number two men to the field, while the principals remained in the division's base camp. In sharp contrast, Gen. DePuy and his assistant division commander, then-Brig. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, went forward daily to keep their fingers on the pulse of platoons, companies and battalions in contact with the enemy or maneuvering to gain contact or provide fire support. The 1st Infantry Division generals were either overhead, monitoring the fight and coordinating fire support, or on the ground, conferring with commanders and teaching soldiers and junior leaders combat skills and techniques. Staff principals promptly got the idea and personally went forward, allowing the number two men to mind the gear in the rear.

The new spirit in the division was captured by a soldier who saw his division commander as "a banty rooster," not a bad way to describe DePuy's barely contained energy packaged in a 5-foot-8-inch body weighing 140 pounds. Gen. Westmoreland did not openly criticize Gen. Seaman, nor has direct documentary evidence of Westmoreland's displeasure with Seaman surfaced, but middlegrade officers and aides close to the generals at the time had the impression that DePuy seemed to be the new spark intended to energize the division. Col. Richard Hooker, U.S. Army retired, junior aide to Gen. Westmoreland, calls DePuy "a brilliant operations officer," adding that he was unfailingly courteous to "underlings" and had a reputation for impatience with briefers who did not know their stuff. He was feared by many, some senior to him, because of his close relationship with Gen. Westmoreland. Col. Hooker said that DePuy descended on his command like a whirlwind, believing he had inherited a mediocre division. Seaman was noted neither for charismatic leadership nor tactical brilliance. Consequently, DePuy cleaned house. Col. Hooker called him ruthless, but remembers him with respect and admiration, believing that those who operated within Gen. DePuy's expectations would agree.

Gen. Seaman's II Field Force staff and some of his former staff at the 1st Division resented the implication that the decent Seaman hadn't cut the mustard. They were loyal to him and defensive. Some wondered why the three-star Seaman didn't come down hard on the two-star DePuy, his immediate subordinate. DePuy's intensity frightened his own people and surprised visitors to his division briefings. Generals DePuy and Hollingsworth, fresh from a day in the field and right on top of events in the division, routinely interrupted and contradicted briefers, creating an atmosphere of great tension on the division staff and in the relations between the 1st Infantry Division staff and the II Field Force staff.

Criticism of his command style and rough treatment of subordinates, however valid, does not negate the high marks DePuy gets for his performance as a division commander from troops in the field and from some high-paid help. Generals Alexander Haig and Paul Gorman-both of whom successively and successfully commanded a battalion in DePuy's division, served as his division G-3, rose to four-star rank, and, in Haig's case, served as secretary of Stategive him rave notices. Haig said he was the best squad leader, platoon leader and company and battalion commander in Vietnam. Gen. Gorman called him an authentic tactical genius, adding that soldiers under his command knew that their general fought hard, fought smart and fought to win.

Maj. Gen. George P. Seneff, as USARV (U.S. Army, Vietnam) Aviation Officer and 1st Aviation Brigade commander, had a vantage point from which he could observe and compare all of the senior commanders in Vietnam. He Called the 1st Infantry Division the most professional division in country, crediting its effectiveness to Gen. DePuy and his assistant division commanders, Jack Deane, Jim Hollingsworth and Bernie Rogers.

Gen. George Joulwan, U.S. Army retired and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, whose first assignment as a 2nd lieutenant was as a platoon leader in DePuy's battle group in Germany, served under him as a company commander and battalion operations officer in Vietnam. Gen. Joulwan admired DePuy's leadership, teaching and infantry skills and was proud to say that he imitated Gen. DePuy. Junior enlisted soldiers, NCOs and officers of all ranks join the chorus of praise, including Gen. Westmoreland, who expressed his earnest hope for DePuy's promotion and division command in Vietnam.

Three specific issues regarding Gen. DePuy's leadership style arose while he commanded his division: friendly casualties; use of artillery, particularly unobserved fire called H&I (harassing and interdiction); and relief of officers. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Harold K. Johnson had reservations about DePuy's judgment in each of these areas, but the relief of officers troubled him most. Just weeks after DePuy took command of his division, bad tactics and poor coordination at the battalion level resulted in heavy American losses in one of his rifle companies. Visiting Vietnam at that time, Gen. Johnson told DePuy that the American people would stop supporting the war if such a rate of combat casualties continued. DePuy responded with tactics he introduced in Vietnam but had been tinkering with in all of his commands from 1944 to 1961 and even while J-3 in Saigon. They were designed to keep Americans out of the kill zone while making maximum use of artillery and air.

Gen. DePuy's relieving subordinates became personal, as Gen. Seaman learned of uncomplimentary remarks circulating about his leadership as division commander. Gen. DePuy-dynamic, imaginative and decisiveran his division from a helicopter just above the jungle, frequently mingling with his soldiers on the ground. Gen. Seaman, conservative and formal, issued orders from his headquarters. He suffered by comparison and knew it. The situation was particularly awkward when he turned the division over to Gen. DePuy and became DePuy's boss. He couldn't fail to see what his hyperactive successor was doing with his former command.

Seaman vented, to the extent his personality permitted, in interviews that showed him to be angry despite maintaining gentlemanly avoidance of personal criticism of a fellow general by name. He said he didn't relieve a single combat commander and was displeased at the allegation that his successor was sent to clean house in the Big Red One. That Gen. Seaman never said anything to his successorwho was raising hell with the outfit he had just commanded and was firing the people Seaman had appointed to important positions-despite the fact he was DePuy's boss, suggests that he was intimidated by DePuy.

Gen. Seaman was particularly pained to learn that his former aide, who had asked him for and received command of a troop of 1/4 Cav as Gen. Seaman was leaving the division, was relieved after he stumbled in an operation a month into command. He was told by the anonymous assistant division commander (Hollingsworth) to "find a job." Seaman said he'd never seen such a broken young man in his life. His humane reaction is admirable, but this incident further illustrates that the DePuyHollingsworth team was entirely focused on combat effectiveness, not on personal feelings or career ambitions.

According to the late Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., Army Chief of Staff Johnson mused in the presence of his vice chief, Creighton Abrams, and his deputy chief for operations (Palmer) about DePuy: If every division commander relieved people as DePuy did, he'd soon be out of lieutenant colonels and majors. Gen. Abrams asked if he should deal with DePuy, but Palmer said that Johnson declined the offer and personally sent a back-channel message (a private correspondence to be read only by the addressee) to DePuy regarding his relief of subordinates. A confrontation between Johnson and DePuy later ensued in Vietnam during Christmastime 1966. Accounts of the confrontation differ, one acrimonious and one amicable.

In a letter to Johnson dated December 29, 1966, DePuy responded to the confrontation and to Johnson's backchannel message. DePuy's subject line is: Personnel Relieved or Transferred During My Period of Command, Other Than Those Through Normal Rotation and Reassignment. (The officers are named in DePuy's letter; they are not named here.) Of 11 relieved officers, seven are battalion commanders. Nine of the 11 are lieutenant colonels, and two are majors. Excerpts from this letter are quintessential DePuy, an example of what Haig called DePuy's abrasive communications style, which others have called ruthless.

Col. A was a fat, disheveled officer without any soldierly characteristics whatsoever who made a bad impression on all those people whom he briefed as a representative of the 1st Division.

Lt. Col. B is completely without talent of any kind whatsoever. He had no initiative, no imagination and repeatedly performed his duties in a sluggish, unintelligent manner.

The first day I saw [battalion commander] C, I strongly suspected that he was weak ... [he] lost complete control over his battalion and suffered a number of unnecessary casualties while inflicting none on the VC. ... I relieved him and indicated on his Efficiency Report that he should not command troops in combat. [He was promoted to full colonel, presumably because DePuy's evaluation of him was not available to the board that recommended promotion.]

[G-5] A completely inadequate officer; no initiative, imagination or drive. Valueless.

[Artillery battalion commander A] refused to admit responsibility personally or for any of his people for gross errors in artillery firing which led to civilian and friendly military casualties. He did not have the character to stand up and be counted.

[Artillery battalion commander B is] a weak officer. He had no force, was not a commander of men. ... In short, he was a man who easily took no for an answer.

[Infantry battalion commander A] is a brave man but lacked the courage to demand high standards from his soldiers and to enforce those high standards.

[Infantry commander B] ... is a third-rate officer who should not be entrusted with command of soldiers in combat.

DePuy's cold objectivity, lucid prose and firm decisions neither assuaged Johnson nor answered the question: What am I going to do with DePuy?

Gen. DePuy was almost certainly the preeminent infantry teacher in his Army, fresh from combat command. Fort Benning, Ga., is where infantry lieutenants and captains learn their trade. The Infantry School and Gen. DePuy were a marriage made in heaven. He wanted the command and almost had it. But, when denied it, the good soldier DePuy accepted the decision of duly appointed authority. His style was to press very hard for what he thought was right, but he understood absolutely that the system he served required discipline.

Col. Robert J. Gerard, U.S. Army retired, describes DePuy as division commander reporting to Gen. Frederick Weyand, who was acting commander of II Field Force in Gen. Seaman's absence. Gen. Weyand, an old friend and fellow division commander, received Gen. DePuy in a friendly manner, but DePuy was formal in reporting to Weyand. Then he made a case for additional helicopters he wanted for an operation, something he did almost daily-and something almost never denied by Seaman. Gen. Weyand listened attentively before denying the request. DePuy acknowledged the decision, rose from his seat, saluted, did an about-face and exited. Col. Gerard, present because he was responsible for the daily allocation of helicopters among subordinate commands, learned that DePuy was a soldier who understood the chain of command and the word no. He did not challenge his acting boss. Why couldn't Gen. Seaman just say no, wondered Col. Gerard. Gen. Weyand knew how to say no.

How DePuy's assignment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff came about is the consequence of Gen. Johnson's disapproval of his methods, Gen. Westmoreland's respect for his competence and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler's need for his currency and expertise regarding Vietnam. (Gen. Wheeler was Army Chief of Staff, 1962-64, and Chairman, JCS, 1964-1970.) Consideration of his next assignment was on the table when Generals DePuy and Johnson clashed in Vietnam. Without specific reference to the personal confrontation, Gen. DePuy's letters to his wife and family remind us that generals are as subject to disappointing personnel decisions as the rest of the Army.

Dear Marj, 9 November 1966: "[F]or your information only, I have a strong indication that I will take command of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning on 1 Feb. Nothing would please me more professionally, although I know you would not be keen about moving into that area." [He understood her preference for the stimulating cultural and social climate of Washington to the less urbane charms of the Chattahoochee Valley and living on a military reservation near Columbus, Ga.]

Dear Marj, [no date, probably November 1966] "I have been told quite definitely that I will return [to the United States] sometime in Feb ... it also appears highly likely that my next assignment will be as commandant of the Infantry Center at Fort Benning."

Dear Marj, 18 December 1966: "General Johnson is going to spend Christmas afternoon and evening with us, staying overnight. At that time, I am quite sure that my next assignment and the timing of my return will be finally decided upon."

Dear Marj, 27 December 1966: "I will depart on or about 15 Feb ... Although you must not discuss this because it is not out in the open yet, I am to be assigned to the JCS in Washington. This will at least take some of the pressure off the house-hunting and house-selling business." [Marj and the children considered Washington their hometown: she was happiest there; the children were in good private schools; and that's where the family remained while DePuy was in Vietnam from 1964 to 1967.]

Dear Marj, 10 January 1967: "My new job is not the one that I would have picked. I made this clear to General Johnson when he was here; however, it appears that General Wheeler and Mr. Vance [Cyrus Vance, Deputy secretary of Defense and later Secretary of State] were the ones to bring about this assignment. I will, of course, do whatever my superiors ask me. My real desire was to go to Benning to teach there what we have learned here because I am sure I could save many lives that way."

Dear Marj, 17 January 1967: "I will tell you all about the reasons for the assignment to SACSA [Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities]."

The reasons were simple: Gen. Johnson didn't want him and Gen. Wheeler did. Johnson was a man of unquestioned integrity.

The antithetical views held by DePuy and Johnson on fundamental issues made it impossible for Johnson to find a place for DePuy in his Army-one cannot hide a major general, even in a big Army. The Joint staff provided a place to use his skills at a critical time and removed him from the direct supervision of the Army's Chief of Staff, a happy solution all around. Gen. Westmoreland later confided to a trusted aide that it was at precisely this point that he saved Gen. DePuy's career by calling Gen. Wheeler regarding Gen. DePuy's availability.

Wheeler's need for DePuy's savvy on Vietnam intensified in the course of the policy review that followed the 1968 Tet Offensive. DePuy's luck held. He enhanced his reputation as a thinking general who was as skilled and comfortable in the corridors of power as he was in close combat.

One can conclude that the command climate in the 1st Infantry Division beginning in March 1966 was such that DePuy can be described fairly as "a new broom." He relieved important leaders in sharp contrast to his predecessor and boss, Gen. Seaman, who did not. Gen. Weyand, who commanded the 25th Infantry Division while Gen. DePuy commanded the 1st Infantry Division, both under Gen. Seaman's II Field Force, regarded DePuy as a really close friend and admired his leadership and intelligence. But Gen. Weyand did not relieve subordinates wholesale and didn't believe in H&I fires. Inevitably, back at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and maybe in Washington, sides were chosen.

Journalists also chose sides. They were generally positive about Gen. DePuy, though dubious about senior leadership in Vietnam. Tension between the media and the military went back to 1963 and the battle of Ap Bac when "young Turk" journalists David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan and Peter Arnett noted a great disparity between what they observed on the field of battle with advisers and what was briefed by American officials in Saigon. MACV press briefings were dubbed "the five o'clock follies" by journalists, indicating that military-media relations were not characterized by mutual trust and confidence. Halberstam essentially called Gen. DePuy a political general, but some important journalists-Joseph Alsop, Morley Safer and Arnett among them-praised DePuy's gutsy and intelligent leadership. Alsop, reporting on the 1st Infantry Division, called it "The new Model Army" (May 1, 1966, Washington Post). Safer reported that DePuy's reaction to an August 1966 friendly fire incident involving his troops showed him to be a cool veteran in explaining that close air support had saved many American lives. Arnett (August 31, 1966, Associated Press) called DePuy a genius who would kill all the Vietcong in his division area north of Saigon, or they would kill him. And DePuy was on the cover of Newsweek (December 5, 1966) while commanding his division.

Why was Gen. DePuy so quick to fire people? The answer is stark in its simplicity. DePuy described the preparation for combat that he experienced in the United States and in England during World War II as the blind leading the blind. Training was poor; leadership was appalling. He went to war with a bunch of incompetents in charge, whose incompetence caused tactical errors and incredible casualties. All this was indelibly stamped on his mind. He noted the absence of active battlefield leadership; known bad actors and incompetents remained in command, and the price paid for this was extremely high. He called the 90th Division of June and July 1944 the greatest killing machine in Europe-of Americans-and his regimental commander, Col. RD. Ginder, a horse's ass of the first order. Maj. Ed Hamilton of DePuy's regiment said that in one week of combat (July 5-12) as a battalion commander, he lost five company commanders, two killed and three wounded.

The 90th Division behaved so badly in June and July that it was called a "problem division." Consideration was given to disbanding it and using its soldiers as replacements in other formations. Then, as incompetent commanders were fired and replaced by quality men at division and regiment, and as junior officers good at war-men like DePuy, Lt. Col. John Mason and Maj. Hamilton-rose to command battalions in a Darwinian process, the division became an effective fighting force. When DePuy was a 25-year-old battalion commander, his regimental commander was 27.

DePuy found heroes and models. He idolized thenCol. George Bittman Barth, commander of the 357th Infantry Regiment, whom DePuy served as S-3; he admired Col. Mason, a battalion and regimental commander of the 357th whose tactical creativity DePuy never forgot; he called Regular Army battalion commander Maj. Hamilton's actions on August 5,1944, pulling demolition wires from explosives on a bridge while under small arms fire, the bravest act he saw in World War II in Europe; he confesses that he shamelessly imitated those men as a battalion commander in combat from December 5, 1944, until the end of the war in Europe in May 1945. He never forgot the difference leadership makes in combat.

While testing infantry battalions for V Corps in Germany in 1953, Gen. DePuy said that those who had commanded in combat were five times as good as those who had not. Saying so does not make it so, but that was his personal conviction. He firmly believed that the way to compensate for not commanding in combat was intelligent and purposeful training. Commanding a battalion again in 1954 and 1955, he emphasized training in infantry skills at the squad and platoon levels. His foxhole and methods of movement to contact were perfected then and would later become associated with his name. George P. Psihas raves about DePuy's leadership and infantry skills, saying DePuy taught him-the only Regular Army company commander in DePuy's battalion and a veteran of the Korean War with a Distinguished Service Cross-how to lead squads, platoons and companies, enabling Psihas to win best platoon and company in corps competition for two years. Psihas also admiringly described the overwatch booklets designed by DePuy, calling them "battle runs."

Commanding a mechanized infantry battle group as a colonel in 1961 and 1962, Gen. DePuy again emphasized squad and platoon infantry skills, adding techniques he had learned observing armor units. These included brevity codes and the extensive use of fragmentary orders to enhance the organic firepower, speed and mobility available to him in the armored personnel carriers that replaced the venerable two-and-a-half-ton truck of World War II and Korea. Gen. Joulwan is effusive in his praise of DePuy's infantry skills, teaching and leadership, saying he shamelessly imitated DePuy in the field and in molding morale by using social activities to teach. Then-Brig. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, chief umpire in evaluating the annual training test of Gen. DePuy's 1st Brigade, 30th Infantry, in May 1961, said that the most striking feature of the test operations from start to finish was the unquestioned ability of then-Col. DePuy to control and command a battle group task force effectively. Many of the highly competent umpires stated that they would be proud to be members of DePuy's well-trained unit. DePuy believed the battle group command was the practical culmination of his experience as an infantry unit commander.

As commander of the 1st Infantry Division in 1966 and 1967, Gen. DePuy personally demonstrated his combat techniques, making the platoon leader his radio operator as he directed squads and platoons in the field where they were conducting combat operations. He vowed in World War II that he would never allow American leaders to kill American soldiers. He meant it! He showed leaders how to lead and was prepared to relieve one if he believed that a leader wasn't up to the task, whether or not the man had failed. He would err on the side of haste in relief when he had any reservations about a leader's competence; delay in relief could cost the lives of American soldiers. It is absolutely true that he was quick to relieve in combat.

Was his relief of subordinates reasonable? The answer to that question comes down to professional opinion. Gen. Johnson clearly thought not. That's why he did not give DePuy command of Benning and the Infantry School-or any job in the Army chain of command.

The aides to the generals, junior officers in a position to observe their bosses in action, bring another and opposite perspective to the issue. Lt. Col. Richard Hooker, the junior aide to Westmoreland, believed DePuy fired incompetents or those simply not up to his standards. Thus sprang up the mythical stories of the 'midnight hook,' the C-47 that suddenly appeared in the dead of the night and whisked away the unwanted, usually battalion commanders never to be heard from again. (Jim Holland, aide to Hollingsworth, recalls the expression being "the midnight Chinook.")

Soldiers also coined the verb DePuy to describe being disciplined or relieved by the commanding general, as in "He was DePuyed." Holland began hearing DePuy stories while still processing into the division. He was interviewed by a personnel major who asked what he wanted to do in the division. Holland understood that if an incoming infantry lieutenant did not want to lead a platoon in combat, another job would be found for him. DePuy wanted "tigers" eager to lead his platoons and was successful in finding them.

Holland's company commander gave him a booklet on tactics signed by DePuy. Holland was new to combat, but he was not a rookie. He had come from Ranger School where he had been an instructor and was thoroughly familiar with the standard aggressive tactics in the booklet. He praises DePuy's adaptability in later espousing new tactics. Upon making contact, Infantry was to avoid being decisively engaged and to use fire support while a supporting element maneuvered.

Brig. Gen. William J. Mullen III, U.S. Army retired, Holland's company commander, said that the esprit and aggressiveness in the division were the results of DePuy's leadership. He changed the division's attitude, raising morale; the troops knew they were in a well-led, aggressive fighting outfit-the Army's premier unit. Mullen, Holland and others describe DePuy putting a battalion's leaders in a platoon as he assumed the position of platoon leader and directed movement in the clover leaf. He was teaching two things: the clover leaf and the technique of providing detailed instructions to subordinate leaders. Mullen calls DePuy a great tactician who had a great affection for the "little fellows."

Highly successful officers, who were at the company to brigade levels under DePuy in Vietnam, bring their mature judgment to the question. They generally concur: DePuy was almost always right in firing people. Gen. Paul Gorman, brave, skilled, erudite and a veteran of combat in the Korean War, commanded a battalion under Gen. DePuy, served as his division G-3 in Vietnam and later worked closely with him at TRADOC in the 1970s. DePuy's son called Generals German and DePuy soulmates, and he believes that Gen. Gorman was perhaps DePuy's only intellectual peer. Asked directly if he agreed with DePuy's re lief of officers, Gorman said that with possibly a couple of exceptions, he did.

Sid Berry said that Generals Terry de la Mesa Allen and Ted Roosevelt Jr., 1st Infantry Division icons from World War II, come to mind when he reflects on Generals DePuy and Hollingsworth running the division in Vietnam. He believes that those who served in DePuy's division will always talk about him, usually admiringly, but not always uncritically. He hypothesizes that like so many "runts," DePuy tended to be cocky and abrasive. Gen. DePuy was extremely confident and knew his soldiering, though he had his flaws.

A reign of fear percolated downward in DePuy's Big Red One, along with pride and effectiveness. The evidence reveals DePuy's intensity, impatience and determination. He fired middle-grade leaders at a rate that won the attention and disapproval of his service chief and earned him a reputation for ruthlessness. Memories of American lives wasted by the incompetent leaders he saw in World War II resulted in his refusal to trust the lives of his soldiers in combat to leaders he did not trust.

There are two grace notes to this conclusion. Asked in 1979 what regrets he had in looking back at his career, DePuy responded that he might have been able to propagate his ideas more effectively if he had been a little more patient with people and spent more time with them "instead of being in such a bloody hurry."

Gen. William G.T. Tuttle, U.S. Army retired, one of DePuy's "bright young men," worked very closely with DePuy on the 1973 reorganization of the Army. He recalled that once in a while on Friday afternoons DePuy would stroll around to the Chief of Army Studies office, gathering a group in John Siegle's office for a martini and to talk. On one such occasion, the topic was people who were not contributing. Tuttle recalls DePuy saying that he could tolerate that without brutalizing people. If they clearly could not go any further, they would not go any further. DePuy made a point to say that he could accept that: "They have done well. They have done a lot for the Army. We recognize that, and we will let them go on with their dignity."

Tuttle saw that DePuy was making a sharp distinction between those who could not keep up on a big staff in peacetime versus leadership in combat. No person's career is worth the sacrifice of soldiers.

It was just that simple.

[Sidebar]

Gen,William E, Depuy-Career Highlights

Corporal, South Dakota National Guard; ROTC 1937-194: battalion commander 1/357 infantry 1944-45: 25-year-old G-3, 90th infantry Division. 1945; General Staff military attache in Hungary; CIA detail during the Korean War: battalion commander (second time) in Germany: Office of the Chief of Staff. Army. 1956-59; Imperial Defence College. London, I960: battle group commander, Schweinfurt. Germany. 1961: Army Staff. 1962-64: Gen. William Westmoreland's 1-3, MACU. Saigon. 1964-66: commanding general. 1st Infantry Division. Vietnam. 1966-67: SACSA, ICS, 1967-69; Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. Army Staff. 1969-1973: first TRADOC commander. 1973-77.

[Sidebar]

Brig. Gen. DePuy had a close working relationship with Gen. William Westmorland (right), who promoted him to three-star rank and made him Assistant Vice Chief of Staff in 1969 at a critical time for the Army.

[Sidebar]

Gen. Alexander M. Haig called DePuy the best squad leader, platoon leader and company and battalion commander in Vietnam.

[Sidebar]

Then-Vice Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Creighton W. Abrams succeeded Gen. Westmorland as commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in 1968.

[Sidebar]

As a colonel in World War II, P.D. Ginder was Gen. DePuy's regimental commander.

[Author Affiliation]

By Col. Henry G. Gole

U.S. Army retired

[Author Affiliation]

COL. HENRY G. GOLE, USA Ret., served four tours in Europe and three in Asia. He holds three master's degrees and a doctorate and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Army War College, where he continues to teach an elective course. He is the' author of numerous articles ("The Relevance of Gen. William E. DuPuy," ARMY Magazine, March 2008), book reviews and books. The University Press of Kentucky will publish his biography of Gen. William E. DePuy in the fall.